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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CONTINENTAL T E L E P H O N E
COMPANY OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

Two Cases
1

STATE TAX COMMISSION
No. 13842
OF UTAH,
and
Defendant,
and
i No. 13843
WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY,
Amicus-Curiae. j

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
These are consolidated cases arising on petitions
for review by this Court of a decision of the State Tax
Commission assessing additional corporation franchise
taxes.
1
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DISPOSITION OF T H E CASES
IN T H E T A X COMMISSION
The Tax Commission's Decision No. 288 partially
disallowed deductions for federal income taxes taken
by Midland Telephone Company and Utah Telephone
Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "taxpayers") in the computation of Utah corporation franchise taxes.
The prior hearing of this matter was before an
administrative commission, under its own rules, which
commission is the defendant in this proceeding. Members of the commission who ruled upon these taxpayers'
plea also took part in establishing commission assessment policies. This case is not an appeal from a lower
court decision, and there has been no previous judicial
determination based on the legal merits.

R E L I E F SOUGHT
Amicus-Curiae submits that the Court should reverse the administrative decision of the Tax Commission and hold the deductions taken by the taxpayers to
be proper.

PURPOSE OF AMICUS CURIAE B R I E F
The major thrust of this amicus brief will be to
demonstrate that the brief prepared for the Tax Com-

2
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mission by the Attorney General relies to a large degree on artificial concepts and arguments which have
nothing to do with the legal issues before the Court.
The brief ignores fundamental principals, clouds the
issues by injecting irrelevant and complicated tax
criteria, asks this Court to create inequities among and
discriminate against certain Utah taxpayers, and constitutes an effort to vest vast legislative powers in the
Tax Commission.
Amicus' special interest in this case arises because
as a Utah corporation, it files a federal consolidated
return with other out-of-state banking corporations but
does not enjoy the privilege (under U.C.A. §59-1323(1) (1953) which requires 95% ownership by one
entity) of filing a Utah consolidated return. Because
it must file a separate Utah return, Amicus finds itself in a position substantially similar to that of Continental Telephone. I t may be assumed that there are
numerous other Utah taxpayers which must follow the
same tax return procedure. Because of the importance
of this case, not only to Continental Telephone, but
also to other Utah taxpayers not represented before
the Court, Walker Bank has petitioned to enter as
Amicus Curiae.
Beyond the technical substantive issues raised by
this case, Amicus wishes to protest before the Court
what may be a new approach of the Tax Commission
to assessments against all taxpayers. Amicus believes

3
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the Tax Commission, in this case, has asked the Court
to give its approval to a system of assessment which is
not grounded upon specific authorization by the Legislature and which relies upon executive branch creation of new tax law by applying phrases and sentences
taken out of context to situations far from those considered by the Legislature.
More dangerous, however, is the introduction of
the boldly expressed theory that it is appropriate to
introduce new interpretations and discriminations between taxpayers if such will increase revenues. (Tax
Commission's Finding of Fact 11 14 (R. 15) cited in
Tax Commission's brief, p. 14).

COLLATERAL

CONSIDERATIONS

This case gives rise to issues not here argued, relating to the sanctity of contracts and inequities which
may be foisted upon minority stockholders as a result
of adherence to a contractual duty without receipt of a
correlating contractual right. For example, under circumstances similar to these cases, a subsidiary with minority stockholders may enter into a contract with a
parent company after arms length negotiations. The
contract could contain a variety of terms and conditions
giving rise to rights and duties, privileges and liabilities and may include an agreement to file a consoli-
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dated return. If the Utah company and its minority
stockholders are to obtain the fruits of the bargain
with the parent company, the Utah company must
have equal treatment under Utah law with other Utah
taxpayers. The equities involved may give rise to a
legal issue, under Utah tax laws, that the payment, by
a subsidiary to the parent, of a separately determined
federal tax pursuant to contract may be an "ordinary
and necessary business expense" within the meaning of
the Utah tax law. This is an issue which requires considerable elaboration and discussion, but which has not
been raised and briefed by the parties to this case.
Walker Bank & Trust Company, as Amicus Curiae,
does not expect the issue to be resolved in the present
litigation, but nonetheless asks the Court to recognize
that an in-depth briefing and argument of the "ordinary and necessary business expense" issue could result
in a decision in favor of the taxpayer, even if the Court
were to hold against the taxpayer on all other issues.
Hence, we urge the Court to withhold making any
ruling which might include that issue until such time
as the question can be fully presented.

S T A T E M E N T OF M A T E R I A L FACTS
Amicus-Curiae believes there is one central fact
which is not adequately disclosed in either brief. The
Tax Commission's disallowance of taxpayers' federal
tax deduction for payments actually made imposes
5
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higher state tax costs upon them than are made by
Utah corporations similarly situated but which do not
file federal consolidated returns.
It is important that at no point in its brief does
the Attorney General dispute the fact that the amount
sought to be disallowed would be deductible if there
were no federal consolidated return filed since the
exact same amount would be paid directly to the Internal Revenue Service.
Under the method employed by the taxpayers to
determine their deduction for "taxes paid", they first
determine their federal tax liability on a separate return
basis. That is, each subsidiary determines what its own
federal tax liability would be if it filed a separate rather
than consolidated federal income tax return. This
amount is then paid to Continental, the stockholder,
under a binding federal consolidated return election,
and taken as a deduction on the taxpayers' Utah franchise tax return. Continental, in turn, pays the federal
consolidated tax liability. There is no "recomputed"
tax calculation, and there is no question but that the
actual payment of the full amount computed has been
made by actual cash transfer out of the state and out
of the Utah taxpayers' corporate funds every year.
Amicus-Curiae adopts the reference notations used
by the Attorney General on p. 1 of his brief, but adopts
the Statement of Facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief,
6
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with the exception of plaintiff's description on p. 6 of
its brief, of the deduction computation which the Tax
Commission alleges is proper.
The alleged appropriate computation would partly
disallow the federal tax deduction taken by reducing
the deduction to the amount which bears the same ratio
to the total consolidated federal tax paid by Continental
which the taxpayers' net income bears to the net income of all profitable subsidiaries combined.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PAYMENTS CALCULATED ACCORDING
TO F E D E R A L L A W U N D E R A B I N D I N G
E L E C T I O N TO F I L E A FEDERAL
CONSOLIDATED RETURN ARE DEDUCTI B L E AS T A X E S PAID".
(A) The Plain Meaning of "Taxes Paid" in
U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953) Includes the Payments by the Taxpayers to Continental.
As described in the Statement of Material Facts
in this Brief (p. 5), and in the Statement of Facts in
the taxpayers' brief, the taxpayers in this case deducted
only their Federal taxes, computed in the same manner
as every other Utah corporation computes its taxes.

7
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They actually paid out those same computed amounts
from corporate funds and the payment was reviewed
by utility regulatory bodies which completely control
the rate of profit they are allowed to make.
The Attorney General is not here challenging any
"loophole" or "gimmick" deduction, nor any inflated
expense. H e is not challenging any hiding of income
or step-transaction intended to avoid recognition of
gain. The entire question here briefed hinges upon one
fact: Instead of making a check out to the Internal
Revenue Service, the taxpayers, following Federal regulations, made their payment of federal taxes to their
controlling shareholder and agent, Continental Telephone.
Under federal regulations, the taxpayers, who had
elected to join in a federal consolidated return, could
not deal directly with the Internal Revenue Service
with respect to payment of their federal taxes. Treas.
Reg. §1.1502-77 (a). They were required to deal through
their agent,1 which had the responsibility of satisfying
the taxpayers' liability to the government in Washington.2 The taxpayers were thus making a payment to
the government through their agent. Continental.
i For purposes of the federal consolidated return, the parent is
made the agent of all subsidiaries. Treas. Reg. §1.1502-77(a).
2 Until the tax liability of the entire consolidated group has
been satisfied through payment by the agent, Continental and
each member of the group is liable for the entire tax due.
Therefore, until full payment was made by Continental, taxpayers had a federal tax liability which could far exceed their
individual computed liability. Treas. Reg. §1.1502-6(a).

8
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The basic question to be answered is: Are payments, (1) which are actually made, (2) which are
computed according to the federal tax formula all
Utah corporations use, and (3) which are paid to the
taxpayers' "agent" under federal tax regulations (a
separate, distinct corporation which has primary responsibility to satisfy taxpayers' federal tax liability),
to be treated the same as "taxes paid" by all other Utah
corporations?
The Utah statute which the Attorney General admits allows a federal "taxes paid" deduction to other
Utah corporations, reads as follows:
"59-13-7. Deductions from gross income.—In
computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions:
Taxes Paid.
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable
year, except —"
(The listed exceptions are not at issue in this
case.)
The term "taxes" is not defined in the Code. However,
the phrase "paid or accrued" is defined in U.C.A. §5913-1(7) as follows:
"(7) The terms . . . "paid or accrued" shall
be construed according to the method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income is
computed."
The taxpayers' method of accounting, dictated by

9
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regulatory bodies, has consistently recognized and accrued federal tax liabilities and federal tax payments
determined on a separate return basis. Upon payment
of the computed taxes,, the corporations suffered an
economic "tax" through the loss of the funds so transferred.
Two midwest states (see below), faced with the
same question now before this Court, have looked directly at the statute, and agreed that the payments involved here are "taxes paid".
(B) Recent Kansas and Iowa Decisions have
Held that Payments made Under Circumstances
Substantially Identical to Those in this Case
should be Considered "Taxes Paid", and a Deluction Allowed Therefor on the State Taw Return.
(1) The Cities Service Case Fact Situation.
The taxpayers' brief discusses the similar Kansas
cases of Cities Service Gas Co. v. McDonald, 204 Kan.
705, 466 P.2d 277 (1970) and Northern Natural Gas
Processing Co. v. McCoy, 197 Kan. 740, 421 P.2d 190
(1967), on pp. 8, 9, and 10 of its brief. The Attorney
General's brief attempts to distinguish the Cities Service case on pages 21 and 22 with what Amicus believes
to be an erroneous reading of the case and a novel and
completely non-legal view of the actions of the Kansas
10
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Legislature. The Attorney General did not respond
to the Iowa case.
Because the facts of Cities Service are not accurately set out in the briefs, they are restated here. The
taxpayer was a wholly-owned subsidiary which filed a
federal consolidated return with the other members of
an affiliated group. Cities Service took a deduction on
its Kansas state return for federal taxes paid in an
amount equal to what its federal tax liability would
have been had it filed its federal return on a separate
rather than consolidated basis. Cities Service paid that
amount over to its parent corporation. For the year in
question, the taxpayer had a separately determined
federal tax liability of $6,367,534 while the consolidated return showed an operating loss and no federal
taxes paid. The refund to the parent which resulted
from a carryback of the consolidated loss, and the payments received by the parent from the profit subsidiaries were paid over to the loss subsidiaries as compensation for the consolidated use of those losses.
(2) The Cities Service Holding.
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the conclusion
of the district court that no gain resulted to the parent
corporation from the payments in question, and that the
subsidiary could fully deduct the payment. The Court
added that:
The district court, in its memorandum decision,
11
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found that as a result of the accounting procedure utilized in this case, no gain resulted to the
parent, . . . from [subsidiary's] payment of $6,367,534, and [the subsidiary] was poorer to the
extent of its liability in that amount. Furthermore, there was no tax saving to [the subsidiary]
because of its taxable income and the tax thereon
having been reported on the consolidated return.
The court concluded that [the sudsidiary] did incur, and pay, federal income tax for the year
1958 in the amount of $6,367,534, and that the
director's disallowance of [the subsidiary's]
claimed deduction was erroneous. Cities Service>
supra at 709.
In order to avoid dealing with the real holding of
Cities Service, the Attorney General set up a "strawman":
.

"Apparently, the Kansas case relied upon the
reasoning thai; there was not tax savings to either
the parent or the subsidiary company as a result
of being included in the consolidated return. (At
page 283) Respondent has previously shown
substantial tax savings to the parent and subsidiaries." (Tax Commission's brief at p. 21).

The Kansas Court did not hold, as the Attorney
General would have this Court believe, that there were
no benefits to be derived from filing the consolidated
return. There were, of course, benefits to the loss subsidiaries. The Court merely stated that there was no
benefit to the profit subsidiary, just as there is no
economic benefit to the taxpayers in this case. The
Kansas Court felt that this was an added factor weighing in favor of the taxpayer's position.
12
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Page 22 of the Attorney General's brief states
that Cities Service has been ' 'overruled" since the Kansas Legislature repealed the statute allowing any corporation, whether or not part of an affiliated group, any
deduction of federal taxes whatsoever. Notwithstanding the change in the underlying statute, the reasoning
of Kansas' Court in dealing with the statute before it
is still of value in construing a similar Utah statute.
The Attorney General does, however, make a valuable point: If the federal tax deduction is to be narowed, specially defined or otherwise modified or eliminated, it should be left to the Utah Legislature to do
so, just as the Kansas Court deferred the same question to a subsequent Kansas Legislature.
(3) Comparison of Controlling Kansas
Statute with U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953).
Neither brief sets out and directly compares the
controlling statutes involved.
In Kansas, General Statutes 1957 Supp. 79-3206
(a) (3) allows a deduction for federal income taxes
"paid" during the year. General Statutes 1949, 793202 defining "paid" reads:
"(8) The word "paid" means 'paid or incurred' or 'paid or accrued' and shall be construed
in accordance with the method of accounting
used as a basis for computing net income under
this act."
13
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The Court construed "paid" to mean the taxpayer was
authorized to deduct its entire federal income tax liability computed on a separate return basis and actually
paid to its parent despite the fact that no consolidated
tax was paid by the parent with its return. Cities Service Gas Co. v. McDonald, supra at 712.
In Utah, U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953) allows the
deduction on the state franchise tax return for "taxes
paid or accrued." U.C.A. § 59-13-1(7) (1953) defines
"paid or accrued":
The terms "paid or incurred" and "paid or
accrued" shall be construed according to the
method of accounting upon the basis of which
the net income is computed.
The statutory provision in Utah defining "taxes paid"
is substantially identical to the Kansas statute. In addition, the method of accounting used by Midland and
Utah Telephone to determine their net income included
a deduction for federal taxes computed on a separate
return basis in the same manner as did the taxpayer
in Cities Service. The Kansas Supreme Court held that
the payment in question amounted to a payment of
federal taxes, and allowed the deduction.
(4) The Massey-Ferguson
lows Cities Service.

Case Fol-

A very recent decision by the State Board of Tax
Review of Iowa follows the holding of the Kansas Su14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

preme Court in Cities Service. See, Massey-Ferguson
Credit Corp. v. Briggs, Decision No. 48 of State Board
of Tax Review of Iowa (July 8, 1974).3 This case is
dealt with by the taxpayers on p. 9 of their brief. However, the Attorney General made no mention of it in his
brief.
In Massey, a federal consolidated return was filed.
The taxpayer was a subsidiary which joined in the federal return, made payments to its parent equal to its
separately determined tax liability, and took a deduction for one-half that amount on its state tax return
(the Iowa statute allows a deduction for one-half the
"taxes paid"). The Iowa Board of Tax Review specifically followed Cities Service and allowed the deduction in full even though no consolidated tax was paid
on the federal consolidated return.
(5) The Trunkline Case, Relied Upon
by the Attorney General, is Distinguished
by the Cities Service Case.
The state argued in Cities Service 4 that Trunkline
Gas Company v. Collector of Revenue (La.App.
1965), 182 S.2d 674, which on its face is factually similar, should be used as a precedent to disallow the de3 See Appendix p. iii for the text of this Decision.
4 The Attorney General makes the same argument on page 22 of
his brief. The taxpayers discuss the case at page 10 of their
brief.

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

duction. The Louisiana statute relevant to the deduction in Trunkline provides that:
. . . The amount of federal income taxes to be
so deducted shall be that portion of the total
federal income tax which is levied with respect
to the particular income derived from sources in
this state to be computed in accordance with
rules and regulations of the collector of revenue
. . . R.S. 47:241. (Emphasis added)
Pursuant to the authority specifically granted by the
statute, the state promulgated a regulaion which provided, in part, that:
Where a corporation includes its net income
in a consolidated federal income tax return, the
portion of the total consolidated tax attributable
to such corporation shall be determined by allocating the tax of the consolidated group to the
several members of the group on the basis of the
percentage of the total tax which the tax of such
member, as computed on a separate return, would
bear to the total amount of taxes for all members
of the group so computed.. . . I T R 55.2.
The Kansas Supreme Court refused to follow
Trunkline. The Court's refusal was based on the fact
that Louisiana had a regulation directly in point, while
Kansas did not, and the Kansas Legislature had never
authorized the promulgation of such a regulation.
(6) The Cities Service Distinction of
Trunkline also applies in this Case.
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The Attorney General cites the Trunkline case as
the authority to be followed in Utah. H e maintains
that Regulation 13 is similar to the Louisiana regulation with respect to the "taxes paid" deduction. I t appears to be the Attorney General's position that the
mere existence of Regulation 13 distinguishes the Cities
Service case.
The Attorney General's brief is misleading when
it says (emphasis added):
"[Trunkline's parent did not pay] Federal income taxes within the contemplation and intentment of L S A - R S 47:55 and 47:241, as to entitle
the Trunkline Gas Company to full credit deduction of the Federal income tax attributable
to Louisiana derived income, which it computes
to be due the Federal Government as though it
were paying this tax on the basis of a separate
tax return. (At page 679) Apparently, the
Louisiana Court based its decision on the statute
requiring payment in fact. It should be noted
that the statute providing for the deduction of
Federal taxes in Louisiana is the same, word-forword, as the statute in question in Utah. (See
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-13-7(3)
(1953)) (Tax Commission's brief, p. 22).
The Attorney General's statement is based on a
half-truth. The statutes providing for full deduction
are, indeed, the same.
"L.S.A.-R.S. 47:55. Deductions from gross
income; taxes generally.
17
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"In computing net income, there shall be allowed
as deductions all taxes paid or accrued within
the taxable year except: [The excepts have no
application to this case.]"
(See, Trunkline, supra at 677)
"U.C.A. 59-13-7. Deductions from gross income.—In computing net income there shall be
allowed as deductions: . . .
Taxes Paid
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable
year, except— . . . "
However, the "statute in question" in Utah is
§ 59-13-1(7) (quoted on p. 9) while the "statute in
question" in Louisiana was R. S. 47:241. They are
completely dissimilar in that they define entirely different terms, and more to the point, Louisiana grants
specific regulatory authority while Utah does not. The
Louisiana statute provides:
"L.S.A.-R.S. 47:241. Net income subject to
tax.
"The net income of a nonresident individual
or foreign corporation subject to the tax imposed
by this Chapter shall be the sum of the net allocable income earned within or derived from
sources within this state, as defined in R.S. 47:
243, and the net apportionable income derived
from sources in this state, as defined in R.S. 47:
244, less the amount of federal income taxes at-
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tributable to the net allocable income and net
apportionable income derived from sources in
this state. The amount of federal income taxes
to be so deducted shall be that portion of the total
federal income tax which is levied with respect
to the particular income derived from sources in
this state to be computed in accordance with rules
and regulations of the collector of revenue.
(See, Trunkline, supra at 677). (Emphasis
added)
The Utah and Kansas statutes are substantially
identical both in allowing the deduction for taxes paid,
and in their definition of "paid or accrued." Neither
Kansas nor Utah authorizes the promulgation of regulations dealing specifically with the deduction of federal taxes paid. See U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953). On
the other hand, Louisiana specifically authorizes such
regulations. Considering the similarity of the Kansas
and Utah statutes and the dissimilarity of the Utah
and Louisiana statutes, it is submitted that, unless the
Tax Commission can establish a specific legislative
grant of regulatory authority (discussed in this brief
beginning at p. 27), it cannot logically be maintained
that our Utah statute, § 59-13-7(3), requires disallowance of taxpayers' deductions. It is, therefore, appropriate for the Utah Court to follow the Kansas case
rather than the Louisiana case and hold that the taxpayers' payments to Continental were, in fact, "taxes
paid."
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POINT II
T H E A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L H A S MISCONSTRUED T H E F E D E R A L REGULATIONS
DEALING
WITH
CONSOLIDATED RETURNS.
The Attorney General, at p. 19 of his brief, has
made certain representations as to how the federal consolidated return regulations work. Unfortunately, he
has misconstrued these regulations to the end that
erroneous prejudicial concepts are interjected.
The first full paragraph on p. 19 of the Attorney
General's brief deals with the payments made by profit
subsidiaries to loss subsidiaries to compensate the latter
for the use of their losses. The first sentence of that
paragraph says "likewise, taxes are reduced by moving in and out of different percentage tax brackets, in
general/' This implies that a consolidated group can
reduce its federal taxes by these payments. This is
simply not true. There is no moving in and out of different tax brackets. There is only one tax bracket, and
that is applied to the consolidated taxable income. Any
shifting of funds between subsidiaries does not change
the consolidated taxable income, and therefore, has
nothing to do with determining how much federal tax
the affiliated group pays.
In a similar erroneous and irrelevant claim, the
second paragraph on p. 19 of the Attorney General's
brief states in part that:
20
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The Treasury Department has provided that
corporations qualifying under Regulation Section 1.1502-33(d) (2) may treat these tax-compensating payments as a deductible tax payment,
both to the profit member making the payment
and to the loss member receiving it. The resulting tax effect is obvious. (Emphasis added)
If anything is obvious, it is that Treas. Reg. § 1.150233(d) has nothing to do with "taxes paid." The only
relevance of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33 (d) is to illustrate
that the method used by the taxpayers is an accepted
method of accounting.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33 pertains to "Earnings and
Profits" (as opposed to "net taxable income"). The
U.S. Supreme Court has found the "earnings and profits" concept (here dealt with in Treas. Reg. §1.1502-33
(d) (2)) a good deal less than obvious:
"earnings and profits' in the tax sense, . . .
does not correspond exactly to taxable income
[and] does not necessarily follow corporate accounting concepts." 5
The earnings and profits concept is primarily intended to serve as an aid in the definition of the income
of shareholders of a corporation. Thus, its role is to
serve as an aid in ascertaining the extent of the pool
of funds, in excess of the invested capital of the corporation, that is available for distribution to the shareholders of the corporation. Hence, the concept serves
5 Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 546 (1945).
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to differentiate those corporate distributions which represent gains on invested capital, which should be taxable, from those that represent a nontaxable return of
capital.
Every corporation must maintain an earnings and
profits account in order to determine the amount of any
distribution which is to be taxed as a dividend under
LR.C. §316(a). The earnings and profits account of
a corporation is reduced by federal income taxes accrued or paid. Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders (3d Ed. 1971)
at 7-18. Reducing the earnings and profits account reduces income which is potentially taxable to a shareholder as a dividend. Therefore, it is necessary to have
rules on how to allocate this reduction when only one tax
is paid by a consolidated group. This is the problem
dealt with by Treas. Reg. §1.1502-33 (d). That regulation does not allow a deduction from gross income for
these compensating payments. Therefore, the tax effect
of this federal regulation is not obvious. In fact, it has
absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the amount
of federal income tax which is paid by a consolidated
group.

POINT III
T H E D E C I S I O N O F T H E T A X COMMISSION IS E R R O N E O U S I N S O F A R AS I T IS
B A S E D U P O N U.C.A. S E C T I O N 59-13-17.
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The Tax Commission states in Conclusion of Law
No. 2 (R. 16):
Utah Code Annotated 59-13-17, which provides
that in any case of two or more corporations
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interest, the Utah State Tax Commission
is authorized to distribute, apportion or allocate
gross income or deductions between and among
such corporations, if it determines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any such corporations.
As partial justification for the attempted application of §59-13-17, the Attorney General, in his brief
at p. 14,6 states ". . . that the failure to apply the Utah
State Corporate Franchise Tax Regulation, No. 13,
would cost the State of Utah revenue. . . ." Certainly
the fact that the State of Utah will gain or lose revenue
is not pertinent to the correct application of §59-13-17.
The correct application of §59-13-17 can only be determined by an analysis of the section itself.
The Tax Commission is attempting to use §59-13-17
to disallow part of the deductions taken by Midland and
Utah Telephone. This is a misuse of the section. Section 59-13-17 authorizes the Tax Commission to ". . .
distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or de6 The misapplication of §59-13-17 is discussed in taxpayers brief
beginning at p. 16.
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ductions . . .," but it does not authorize the Tax Commission to disallow a deduction, in whole or in part.
The absence of the word "disallow" from § 59-13-17 is
not merely a matter of semantics.
Section 59-13-17 is taken almost word for word
from § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. The only
changes in § 59-13-17 are those necessary to convert
it from a federal to a state statute. The substance of
the provision remains the same as § 482. Bittker &
Eustice in their work on corporate taxation state that:
. . . the Commissioner's powers under § 482 only
permit the reallocation of incomes or deductions
among various members of the affiliated group,
the section cannot be used to disallow deductionsj and in this respect is narrower than § 269.
Bittker & Eustice, supra at 15-22. (second emphasis added)
In dealing with the proper use of § 482, Bittker &
Eustice go on to state that:
One of the principal features of the regulations
is the correlative adjustment procedure of Regs.
§ 1.482-1 (d) (2). By requiring an appropriate
correlative adjustment to be made on behalf of
other members of the group who are affected by
the primary adjustment under § 482, the regulations emphasize the fact that § 482 is an allocation section, rather than a disallowance provision.
For example, if income is reallocated from subsidiary X to subsidiary Y under § 482, the income of X must be decreased to take account of
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the fact that the income has been attributed to
Y. Id. at 15-30.
The above citation from Bittker & Eustice points
up the proper use of §§482 and 59-13-17. Those sections assume that a total deduction figure has already
been arrived at (e.g., the amount of a federal "taxes
paid" deduction), and that the only question remaining
is how much of the total deduction each subsidiary
should get.
To illustrate the proper use of §59-13-17 consider
the following example:
A and B are wholly owned subsidiaries of X and
all three corporations join in filing a federal consolidated return. A is profitable, but B operates
at a loss. B has an asset which it has fully depreciated, and which could be used in A's business. The fair market value of the asset is $100,000. B sells this asset to A for $200,000.
The sale is made because, although B will have
a large gain on the sale, it will have no taxable income
(and therefore no tax) because it has been operating
at a loss. On the other hand, A will have a higher basis
in the asset which it can depreciate. The net effect is
that A will be able to shelter more tax dollars, because
of the higher depreciation costs, but there will be no
cost to the group because of B's financial position.
This example is a proper situation for the application of §59-13-17. Under that section, it would be ap-
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propriate for the Tax Commission to allow A to depreciate the asset on a $100,000 basis only. As a corresponding adjustment, the Tax Commission would reduce the gain attributable to B by $100,000. To apply
the section properly, there must be this corresponding
adjustment.
In the present case, the Tax Commission is not
seeking to make an adjustment. What the Tax Commission seeks to do is to entirely disallow part of a deduction. Under the application sought by the Tax
Commission, there would be no corresponding adjustment for any other subsidiary. No other susidiary of
Continental would be a,ble to eliminate from its income
the amount of the deduction disallowed the taxpayers.
Such a use of §59-13-17 is not proper, and should not
be permitted by the Court. The substantive determination of what the "taxes paid" deduction is should be
left to the provisions specifically dealing therewith.
Section 59-13-17 should be left for the situation where
the allocation of an already determined deduction is
being improperly manipulated.
As has been shown repeatedly throughout this brief,
there is no distortion of income and there is no evasion
of taxes whatsoever. There is therefore no basis on
which to consider use of §59-13-17.
P O I N T IV
T H E TAX COMMISSIONS APPLICATION
26
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O F R E G U L A T I O N 13 TO T H E S E
P A Y E R S IS IN ERROR.

TAX-

(A) No General Authority to Regulate is
Given by the State Constitution.
The Attorney General's citation of the Constitution on p. 7 of his brief, by the words quoted, only gives
power to "administer and supervise" laws, not interpret
or issue regulations.
(B) The Tax Commission Has No Authority Under U.C.A. §59-5-46 To Promulgate
Franchise Tax Regulations.
U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953), according to the Attorney
General in his brief at page 8, is a general source of
power for the promulgation of Regulation 13. However, by citing this section as authority for Regulation
13, the Attorney General proposes to give the Tax
Commission unlimited regulatory authority far beyond
that given by the Legislature and never approved by
this Court.
The title of U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953) is "General
Powers and Duties." That code section was enacted
under Chapter 5 of Title 59. Chapter 5 of Title 59
is entitled "Assessment of Property", and deals generally with the assessment of property. Chapter 13, on
the other hand, is the chapter wherein the powers of

27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Tax Commission with respect to the franchise tax
are contained.
The relevant statutory scheme is made clear by
reference to Exhibits " A " and "B". 7 Exhibit " A "
shows the general listing of the chapters included under
Title 59, "Revenue and Taxation." Section 59-5-46
(1953) is subsumed under the title "Assessment of
Property." It seems more than strange that such broad
regulatory power over the franchise tax would be placed
in an obscure section dealing with the assessment of the
property tax.
Exhibit " B " , the first page of Chapter 5, shows
that the chapter clearly is concerned with the specific
area of property assessment and the Tax Commission's
role in property assessment, not corporate franchise
taxes, nor general, all-encompassing regulatory grants.
In addition, the Attorney General's contention that
U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953) gives the Tax Commission the
power to promulgate corporate franchise tax regulations does not comport with a proper construction of
that section. Each subsection in U.C.A. §59-5-46
(1953) deals with some aspect of the assessment of the
property tax and the powers of the Tax Commission
with respect thereto. The purpose of the section was
to detail the powers and duties of the Tax Commission
with respect to the property tax. Section 59-5-46 has
7 Appendix, pp. i and ii.
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nothing to do with the corporate franchise tax which
is separately treated in Chapter 13 of Title 59.
It seems clear that the Attorney General's claim
for the Tax Commission of general regulatory authority under §59-5-46, and therefore, the main base of
Points I and I I in the Attorney General's brief, must
fall since it focuses on a few words rather than the law
in its context. The Attorney General has erred in
ignoring the plain-spoken purpose and policy of Chapter Five. Judge Learned Hand once said,
"There is no more likely way to misapprehend
the meaning of language—be it in a constitution, a statute, a will or a contract—than to read
the words literally, forgetting the object which
the document as a whole is meant to secure."
Central Hanover Bank <§ Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d CA 1947).
It would be hard to find a better case to illustrate this
perceptive observation. In sum, an attempt is made
to derive an over-arching expansion of regulatory power from the "literal" meaning of this section deeply
buried in the property tax assessment chapter.
One final point should be made. The Attorney
General's construction of a general regulatory power
for the Tax Commission under U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953)
is completely at odds with the clear intent of the Legislature only to make specific grants of regulatory
power, section by section, with respect to the corpor29
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ation franchise tax. See the discussion under P O I N T
IV.
(C) Regulation 13 Can Apply only to Taxpayers which File Utah Consolidated Returns.
(1) The A ttempt to Apply Regulation
13 to These Taxpayers Must Fail if it is
Grounded Upon U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3).
Following the lead of the Utah Constitution, the
Utah Legislature has not given broad grants of regulatory power to the Tax Commission. Where the Legislature has felt that regulation is necessary, it has made
very specific grants of regulatory power. This can best
be illustrated by U.C.A. § 59-13-7 (1953), which is the
section containing the federal income tax deduction.
That section has various subsections, each of which
deals with a different deduction. In § 59-13-7, the
Legislature gives the Tax Commission authority to
promulgate rules and regulations with respect to some
deductions, but not others. For example, Subsection
10 of that section, dealing with the deduction of future
expense liabilities as a result of a casual sale of real
property, directs the Tax Commission to prescribe regulations pertaining thereto. The subsection provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction:
In the case of a casual sale or other casual
disposition of real property, a reasonable allowance for future expense liabilities incurred under
the provisions of the contract under which such
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sale or other disposition was made, under such
regulations as the tax commission may prescribe.
U.C.A. § 59-13-7(10) (1953). "(Emphasis
added)
In addition, the Legislature directs the Tax Commission under U.C.A. § 59-13-7(8) (1953) to prescribe
rules and regulations with respect to depletion deductions. These subsections contrast with the "taxes paid"
deduction of U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953), which
makes no mention of any authority given to the Tax
Commission with respect to the prescription of rules
and regulations for the deduction of "taxes paid."
It is evident from these illustrations that where the
Legislature desires regulation by the Tax Commission,
it makes a specific grant of authority. Without such
authority the Tax Commission has no power to make
law by regulation. If a need for regulatory authority
in this area is found to exist, the proper forum for the
executive branch is in the Legislature.
(2) The Attempt to Apply Regulation
13 to these Taxpayers Must Fail if
Grounded on U.C.A. $59-13-23.
(a) For Regulation 13 to be Valid, it
Must Have Been Promulgated by the
Taw Commission under Authority Granted in U.C.A. §59-13-23 (2) (1953).
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As discussed above, the Tax Commission does not
have a general power to promulgate Regulation 13, nor
does it have authority under U.C.A. §59-5-46 1953).
Whatever power the Tax Commission has for the promulgation of Regulation 13 must come from U.C.A. §5913-23(2) (1953). 8
Utah Code Annotated §59-13-23 (1953) deals with
the filing of Utah consolidated returns. Subsection (2)
of that section provides that:
"(2) The tax commission shall prescribe such
regulations as it may deem necessary in order
that the tax liability of an affiliated group of
banks and/or corporations M A K I N G A CONS O L I D A T E D R E T U R N and of each corporation in the group, both during and after the
period of affiliation, may be determined, computed, assessed, collected and adjusted in such
manner as clearly to reflect the income and to
prevent avoidance of tax liability." (Emphasis
added).
The Attorney General, in his brief at p. 10, tries
to extend the application of regulations promulgated
under the authority of U.C.A. §59-13-23(2) (1953) to
all "affiliated groups" (whether or not they file Utah
consolidated returns). This is an incorrect interpretation of that subsection.
As discussed in Point III and Point IV D, there is no authority
for Regulation 13 inherent in §59-13-17 and no other section
has been cited as authority for Regulation 13.
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Section 59-13-23 is entitled "Consolidated Returns." Each subsection of that section deals with some
aspect of the "privilege" of filing a Utah consolidated
return. The very language of the subsection says that
it applies to ". . . corporations making a consolidated
return . . . " If a corporation does not file a Utah consolidated return the section does not apply to it.
The Attorney General's argument to expand the
Utah consolidated return statute to cover taxpayers
who do not file a Utah consolidated return, must be
restated (with emphasis supplied), to appreciate the
point upon which it relies:
"The statute authorizes the Tax Commission
to prescribe such regulations for 'of each corporation in the group, both during and after the
period of affiliation . . . .' Certainly, after the
period of affiliation, a corporation would not be
filing a consolidated Utah income tax return;
hence, the above subsection (2) reaches all situations dealing with an affiliated group of corporations, as defined.9
The Attorney General misinterprets the meaning of
this sentence by taking it out of context.
Franchise Tax Regulation 4, §4.9, makes a subsidiary which was part of an affiliated group, but is not
now "affiliated", liable for any deficiency against the
affiliated group for a period during which a consolidated return was filed, if such return included the sub9 Tax Commission's Brief at p. 10.
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sidiary. This liability remains even after the subsidiary is no longer a member of the affiliated group. I t
is this situation which the sentence relied on by the
Attorney General was intended to cover.
The Attorney General, on p. 10 of his brief, states
that the taxpayers "make no contention that they are
not a member of an affiliated group as defined in the
above-cited statutes". This point is irrelevant. Section
59-13-23, and the regulations promulgated thereunder,
do not rely for their application on the "affiliation" of
corporations. Rather, an "affiliated group" must elect
to file a Utah consolidated return before this section is
operative. "Affiliation" has significance only in that
corporations must be "affiliated" to file a consolidated
return. The taxpayers did not file a Utah consolidated
return, and are, therefore, not bound by the regulations
promulgated under authority of §59-13-23.
(b) The Kennecott Case Ties the
Validity of Regulation 13 to the Filing
of a State Consolidated Return under
U.C.A. §59-13-23 (2) (1953).
The Attorney General argues that the Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Regulation 13 in the Kennecott case. The Attorney General
concludes from the Kennecott case that the Tax Commission has blanket authority to apply Regulation 13 to
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any Utah corporate taxpayer.10 The portion of the
opinion which the Attorney General so construes reads:
Kennecott further contends that the Commission erred in its allocation of deductible federal
income tax to the Utah affiliated group. This
matter was handled in accordance with the regulation of the Commission rather than federal
regulations. Kennecott was bound by the regulations of the Commission and we perceive no
error in its application. Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. State Tax Commission, 27 U.2d 119, 125, 493
P.2d632 (1972).
There is an important factual difference between
the Kennecott case and this case: Kennecott filed a
Utah consolidated return. The taxpayers in this case
filed a federal consolidated return, but their Utah returns were filed separately. The language of the Court
in Kennecott specifically mentioned that the allocation
was to be made to the Utah affiliated group (a reference to the fact that the deduction in question was
taken on a Utah consolidated return). The Court further pointed out that Kennecott was bound by the regulations of the Tax Commission. This was a reference
to U.C.A. § 59-13-23(1) (1953) which makes the filing
of a Utah consolidated return conditional on the acceptance of regulations which deal with state consolidated
returns. Kennecott had, therefore, accepted Regulation
13.
io See, Conclusion of Law No. 3 in the Tax Commission's decision
in The Matter of Midland Telephone, Decision No. 288.
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The Tax Commission emphasized the importance
of Kennecott's consent in their Conclusions of Law
from the Kennecott hearing before the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission's Kennecott decision contained 25 Conclusions of Law. Of those 25 Conclusions
of Law, only one dealt with the question of the deductibility of federal taxes. That conclusion was Conclusion of Law No. 14:
Kennecott accepted and is bound by Commission regulations governing the filing of consolidated returns, including Regulation 4 and Regulation 13 and,, therefore, the action of Kennecott in claiming a deduction for Federal Taxes
pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.1502-33 (d)
(2) is improper.11
The Tax Commission disposed of Kennecott's entire
"taxes paid" argument with the statement that Kennecott was bound by Regulation 13 since Kennecott had
consented to its application.
The importance of consent to the consolidated return regulation was again emphasized by the Attorney
General in his appeal brief to the Utah Supreme Court
in Kennecott:
Tax Commission Regulation 4(4) (b), conditions the Tax Commission's acceptance of a consolidated return upon the filing by the affiliated
group of a Form 22, wherein the group consents
ii Regulation 4 deals with who may file Utah consolidated returns, etc., and is not an issue here.
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to the application of Utah Regulations as
adopted. (See the Tax Commission's Brief,
supra at 55.)
Although it cited the regulation rather than the controlling statute (§ 59-13-23(1)), the Attorney General's point was that Kennecott had no room to argue
that Regulation 13 did not apply to it since Kennecott
had specifically consented to Regulation 13's application by filing a Utah consolidated return. This is reiterated at page 57 of the Attorney General's Kennecott brief:
Thus, it appears that Kennecott in filing a
consolidated return in the State of Utah has
agreed to be bound by the Commission Regulations governing the filing of such consolidated
returns, including but not limited to Regulation
13. Under the provisions of Regulation 13, no
Federal tax can be assigned to loss items and
Federal Regulation 1.1502-33(d) (2) has no applicability.
The Attorney General cites Kennecott for the
proposition that Regulation 13 has general application
to all Utah corporate taxpayers. 12 However, the material quoted supra from page 125 of the Kennecott
opinion is the only material in the opinion which deals
with the question of the deductibility of the federal income taxes paid by Kennecott's federal consolidated
group, and even then the Court merely held that KenneV2 Tax Commission's brief at p. 18.

37
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cott was bound by that regulation since it filed a Utah
consolidated return. It did not deal with the general
application of Regulation 13 to separate return taxpayers.
(c) Midland and Utah Telephone Did
Not File a Utah Consolidated Return
and are not Bound by the Tax Commissions Utah Consolidated Return Regulations, including Regulation 13.
Utah Code Annotated §59-13-23(1) (1953) provides in pertinent part that:
The making of a consolidated return shall be
upon the condition that all the corporations
which have been members of the affiliated group
at any time during the taxable year for which
the return is made consent to all the regulations
under subsection (2) of this section prescribed
prior to the making of such return; and the making of a consolidated return shall be considered
as such consent. (Emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated § 59-13-23(1) (1953) by its
terms limits application of regulations promulgated
under authority granted by subsection (2) to those
corporations which file Utah consolidated returns, and
thereby consent to such subsection (2) regulations.
The taxpayers do not file and have never filed Utah
consolidated returns. Midland and Utah Telephone
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file their state returns on a separate basis. Since they
do not file Utah consolidated returns, they are not
subject to the provisions of U.C.A. § 59-13-23 (1953).
Consequently, they did not and could not consent to
the Tax Commission's regulations dealing with Utah
consolidated returns. They did not and could not give
the Form 22 consent obtained from Kennecott by the
Tax Commission. Since Regulation 13 was promulgated under authority granted the Tax Commission by
the Legislature to deal with Utah consolidated returns
and requires consent for its application, it did not and
could not apply to either taxpayer in this case.
(D) The Attempt to Apply Regulation 13
to These Taxpayers Must Fail if Grounded on
U.C.A. § 59-13-17 (1953).
There is no grant of regulatory power in § 59-1317. That section only applies, as the Attorney General
admits on p. 14 of his brief, when the Tax Commission
has found that a properly determined tax grounded on
another statute is being evaded.

POINT V
R E G U L A T I O N 13, I F V A L I D , C A N N O T ,
B Y I T S O W N T E R M S , A P P L Y TO T H E
P R E S E N T CASE.
(A)

Introduction.
39
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There are only two subsections of Regulation 13
which may under any construction apply to the taxpayers. The first is Regulation 13, § 13.3. That subsection is entitled "Accrual Basis Taxpayer". The second possibly applicable section is Regulation 13, § 13.4,
entitled "Assignment of Federal Incomes Taxes". As
will be pointed out in more detail below, neither of
these subsections applies in this particular case.
(B) Section 13.3 of Regulation 13 is Merely
an Accounting Method Definition.
Subsection 13.3(a) is the pertinent part of § 13.3.
That subsection provides:
"In the case of an accrual basis taxpayer, the
amount of federal income tax to be allowed as a
deduction in arriving at the total corporate net
income for Utah franchise tax purposes is normally limited to the amount of the actual federal
income tax liability in connection with its federal
return for the same period.
The Attorney General, for purposes of this case, construes this subsection to mean that taxpayers' federal
tax deduction is limited to their computation of the proportionate share of the total federal consolidated tax
actually paid over by taxpayer's shareholder corporation.
However, the Attorney General's present construction is clearly at odds with the original meaning of sub-
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section 13.3(a). The subsection was meant to be an
instruction to an accrual basis (as opposed to cash
basis) taxpayer as to the method it must employ in
determining the timing of its federal tax deduction for
any particular year. The issue dealt with in subsection
13.3(a) is whether the federal tax deduction is limited
to the amount of federal taxes due on the net income
of the taxpayer for the applicable year, or whether the
taxpayer may also deduct taxes assessed for previous
years which it pays in the present year or which come
to a final determination through litigation or administrative procedure in the present year.
The purpose of subsection 13.3(a) is made clear
by the other subsections under § 13.3. Since, as explained above, under subsection 13.3(a), the accrual
basis taxpayer may not deduct, in a current year, taxes
which are paid in that current year, but on net income
from prior years, subsection 13.3(b) provides that the
taxes accruing for the prior years must be taken by
filing amended returns for those prior years rather than
deducting the amount currently.
Consider the following illustration:
A corporation is an accural basis taxpayer. I t
has paid federal income taxes since 1960. In
1975, the I R S assesses a deficiency of $10,000
for 1972. In 1975, A pays the $10,000 deficiency
and accrues a federal tax liability of $50,000 for
its 1975 taxable income. Under Regulation 13,
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A may only deduct $50,000 on its 1975 return
even though it accrued $60,000 in taxes that year.
I t must deduct the other $10,000 by amending its
1972 return.
As the subsections illustrate, the intent of subsection 13.3 (a) was to instruct the corporate taxpayer that
it could deduct currently only those federal taxes which
are based on current net income. It has nothing to do
with the problem before this Court.
This conclusion is bolstered when the Court considers the addition made to subsection 13.3(a) of Regulation 13 effective for tax years beginning after January 1, 1973. The amendment was made by the Tax
Commission following the Kennecott case, which was
the first court case to question Regulation 13. The
1973 addition to Regulation 13.3 (a) provides:
In case the corporation was included in a
consolidated return for federal income tax purposes, the amount of federal income tax to be
allowed as a deduction in arriving at the net
income of the corporation shall be limited to its
proportionate share of the actual federal income
tax due with the federal consolidated return for
the same period. The proration of the allowable
federal tax must be made only to profit-producing corporations included in the consolidated return.
The intendment of the language in this addition is
quite clear. Without any reference to new legislation,
it attempts to expand Regulation 13 to deal with sep-
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arate corporations which file federal consolidated returns. Even if this bootstrap amendment were found
to be controlling, it affects only tax years beginning
after January 1, 1973. As the Attorney General states
in his brief at p. 16:
"The [present] Corporation Franchise Tax
Regulation No. 13 . . . is not the regulation in
effect under the present fact situation during the
taxable years in question and should be disregarded. (AB-Appendix) (See Exhibit 17) In
particular, the second paragraph in Section 13.3
(a) is not found in the Regulation 13 applicable
to this situation." (Emphasis added)
The Attorney General has made taxpayers' case
—the very computation which the Tax Commission
seeks to impose upon the taxpayers (§ 13.3(a), second
paragraph) is unot the regulation in effect under the
present fact situation" and "in particular, the second
paragraph in Section 13.3(a) is not found in the Regulation 13 applicable to this situation."
The Tax Commission cannot have it both ways.
Either the 1973 amendment to Regulation 13 is valid
and does not apply in the years in question to these taxpayers or it was redundant and totally unnecessary.
A more reasonable premise is that, following the
Kennecott challenge, the Tax Commission realized that
Regulation 13, as it existed prior to January 1, 1973,
could not cover corporations filing consolidated federal
returns and separate Utah returns.
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It should not go unnoticed that the Attorney General has failed to respond adequately to the above argument in its brief at p. 16. Certainly, totally unsupported (see Tax Commission's brief at p. 16) conclusionary statements are not sufficient. The Attorney
General's complete response to the above argument is
as follows :
"Appellant's argument . . . in this matter, is untenable. This argument is irrelevant and bears
similarity to the 'subsequent repairs' reason for
nonadmissibility of evidence under the Utah
Rules of Evidence 51." 13
The "similarity" suggested by the Attorney General
does not explain in any way why taxpayers' argument
is "untenable" or "irrelevant". Rule 51 is, of course, a
policy decision to encourage "subsequent repairs."
(C) Section 13.4 of Regulation 13 is an Allocation Provision which Does Not Apply to
the Taxpayers.
The only other part of Regulation 13 which the
Attorney General now construes to apply to Midland
and Utah Telephone is § 13.4. The pertinent portion
of § 13.4 of Regulation 13 provides as follows:
"An assignment of a portion of the total allowable federal income tax deduction on the
13 Tax Commission's brief at p. 16.
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Utah corporation franchise tax return may be
required for certain purposes . . . Corporation
Franchise Tax Regulation No. 13, § 13.4(a).
(Emphasis added)
This section contemplates a situation where the "total
allowable federal income tax deduction" has already
been determined. In such a case, this section then provides a means by which the liability is allocated between income allocable to Utah and income derived
from activities outside of Utah. The section does not,
contrary to the contention of the Attorney General,
purport to determine the amount of the "total allowable
federal income tax deduction".
This construction of subsection 13.4(a) is made
even clearer by subsection 13.4(c) and the addition to
subsection 13.3(a). Subsection 13.4(c) is an amplification of subsection 13.4(a), and provides that "federal
income tax assignments are to be made to profit-producing items or divisions only." The plain meaning of
"items or divisions" is that the entities receiving the
assignments are all part of the same corporation rather
than corporate subsidiaries of the same parent corporation. If the section had been intended to apply to
subsidiary corporations such as Midland and Utah Telephone, it would have used the word "corporations"
rather than "items or divisions". This construction can
be illustrated by the addition to subsection 13.3(a)
effective after January 1, 1973. That addition clearly
was intended to apply to subsidiary corporations filing
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federal consolidated returns. The addition to subsection 13.3(a) refers to "profit-producing corporations/'
The conclusion follows, that when the Tax Commission
in its regulation intends that application be made to
subsidiary corporations, it clearly states that intention.
The following is an example of how subsection 13.4
was intended to work:
X has subsidiaries A and B. A, is a Utah
corporation with divisions doing business in and
out of Utah. B, a California corporation, does
business only in that state. The X group files
a federal consolidated return.
The amount of federal tax liability allocated
to A is the "total allowable federal income tax
deduction" of A. That amount is not determined
under subsection 13.4(a), which assumes the
amount of the total deduction has already been
determined, but rather it is computed under statute and generally accepted methods of accounting. Once the amount of "total allowable federal income tax deduction" is determined for A,
subsection 13.4 (a) requires that a portion of that
total deduction be allocated to Utah income and
a portion be allocated to non-Utah income.
Subsection 13.4(a) is not intended to determine how the total consolidated tax is to be
divided between A and B, which are separate
corporations.
In our case, the Court must determine the taxpayers' "total allowable federal income tax deduction".
This is not covered by subsection 13.4(a) which only
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covers the allocation A must make between Utah and
non-Utah income. The taxpayers' income allocation is
not in dispute here. Therefore, the taxpayers' share
of the total Continental deduction is not brought into
issue by subsection 13.4 (a).
The Attorney General in his brief at p. 16 also
cites subsection 13.4(b) of Regulation 13 as authority
for its present position. Such a construction is inconsistent both with the language of subsection 13.4(b),
and with the general purpose of § 13.4 as set out above.
Subsection 13.4(b) speaks in terms of "assigning"
federal income taxes to "segments of net income subject to federal income tax. . . ." The term "segments
of net income" is consistent with the example above.
That term deals with intracompany assignments. I t
was not meant to be used for assignments between separate corporations. If the latter had been the intent
of the subsection, it would have used a phrase such
as "subsidiary's net income." Subsection 13.4(b) just
does not apply to the taxpayers since there is no dispute as to whether they properly allocated any tax
deduction between Utah and non-Utah income.

P O I N T VI
R E V E N U E R A I S I N G POLICY CONSIDE R A T I O N S M U S T B E L E F T S O L E L Y TO
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE.
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The Attorney General has attempted to prejudice
the consideration of the legal merits of this case by introducing two categories of non-legal revenue "policy"
considerations which the Court should reject.14 The
first attempts to make the obvious sound dangerous—
that the Tax Commission will collect less revenue than
it seeks if it loses this case. The second category is a
mistaken version of the federal tax law and its impact
on Utah revenues, and is highlighted by such phrases
as: "subsidize the elimination of intercompany profits";
"Legislature should set the guidelines if affiliated companies are to get tax relief"; "reduction of the franchising fee necessarily discriminates against intrastate
domestic corporations"; "federal tax loopholes"; "ties
the State of Utah to everchanging federal tax regulations."
The Attorney General points out in its "Policy"
No. 1 that if the Tax Commission loses this case it will
be deprived of the additional revenues it seeks. This is,
of course, implicit in any case involving the Tax Commission and is not relevant to a correct application of
the law. In any case, the increase would be fleeting
because of the stifling effect on competition and future
growth created by such discriminatory applications of
the tax laws.
The second category results from the Attorney
General's misunderstanding of the federal tax law. In
14 Tax Commission's brief at pp. 23-24.
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summary, the taxpayers determine their "taxes paid"
deduction based on their Utah net income just as any
other Utah corporation. They then pay this amount to
Continental, their agent for payment of federal taxes,
just as any other Utah corporation would pay it to the
Internal Revenue Service. The taxpayers ask only for
the same deduction they would be entitled to if they
did not file a federal consolidated return. They do not
seek an advantage over any other Utah corporation.
The Attorney General misunderstands these basic
facts. There will be no reduction of the franchising fee
if the taxpayers win this case. Rather, the taxpayers'
franchising fee will be an identical percentage of their
taxable Utah income as is any other Utah corporation's.
The federal regulations which the Attorney General
refers to as impinging on Utah revenues have nothing
to do with the determination of the franchise tax. Those
federal regulations only affect the taxpayers' "earnings
and profits" — which is a concept entirely distinct from
taxable income and has nothing to do with any tax the
corporations pay.
Amicus Curiae would like to point out the real
impact of this case if the Tax Commission prevails —
the franchising fee will be increased for the taxpayers
and all other Utah corporations filing federal consolidated returns. The Tax Commission is attempting to
punish these Utah corporations, regulated in all respects by Utah and serving Utah consumers, for filing
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federal consolidated returns. Without some expression
to the contrary, the intention to exact the penalty here
sought by the Tax Commission should not be attributed
to the Utah Legislature.

CONCLUSION
The State Tax Commission's decision denying a
full "taxes paid" deduction to Midland Telephone
Company and Utah Telephone Company should be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
D O N A L D B. H O L B R O O K ,
M E R R I L L R. W E E C H , and
L A R R Y C. H O L M A N of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & M C D O N O U G H
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Amieus-Curiae
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APPENDIX
E X H I B I T "A"

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 6B

TITLE 59
REVENUE AND TAXATION
Chapter

1. Tax on Tangible Property, 59-1-1.
2. Exemptions, 59-2-1 to 59-2-3, 59-2-5 to 59-2-13, 59-2-17 to 592-31 [59-2-4, 59-2-14 to 59-2-16 Repealed].
3. Definitions, 59-3-1.
4. Situs, 59-4-1, 59-4-2.
5. Assessment of Property, 59-5-1 to 59-5-19, 59-5-21 to 59-5-46,
59-5-47 to 59-5-67, 59-5-67.2 to 59-5-81, 59-5-83 to 59-5-111
[59-5-20, 59-5-46.1, 59-5-67.1, 59-5-82 Repealed].
6. Apportionment, 59-6-1 to 59-6-3.
7. Equalization, 59-7-1 to 59-7-15.
8. County Auditors' Duties, 59-8-1 to 59-8-10.
9. Levies, 59-9-1 to 59-9-5, 59-9-6.1 to 59-9-13 [59-9-6 Repealed].
10. Collection of Taxes, 59-10-1 to 59-10-72.
11. Miscellaneous Provisions, 59-11-1 to 59-11-15 [59-11-16 Repealed].
12. Inheritance Tax, 59-12-1 to 59-12-37, 59-12-39, 59-12-40, 59-1242 to 59-12-44 [59-12-38, 59-12-41 Repealed].
13. Franchise and Privilege Taxes, 59-13-1, 59-13-3 to 59-13-19, 5913-22 to 59-13-97 [59-13-2, 59-13-20, 59-13-21 Repealed].
14. Individual Income Tax, 59-14-1 to 59-14-72 [59-14-73 to 59-1480 Repealed].
14A. Individual Income Tax Act of 1973. 59-14A-1 to 59-14A-98.
15. Sales Tax, 59-15-1 to 59-15-4, 59-15-4.6 to 59-15-22 [59-15-4.5
Repealed].
36. Use Tax, 59-16-1 to 59-16-3, 59-16-3.6 to 59-16-22, 59-16-24, 5916-25 [59-16-3.5, 59-16-23 Repealed].
17. Chain Store License, [59-17-1 to 59-17-9 Repealed].
18. Tobacco Licenses, 59-18-1 to 59-18-4, 59-18-5 to 59-18-15, 5918-17 to 59-18-19 [59-18-4.1, 59-18-16 Repealed].
19. State Tax System Committee, 59-19-1 to 59-19-7.
20. Uniform System of Accounts, 59-20-1 to 59-20-3.
21. Oleomargariue Excise Tax, [59-21-1 to 59-21-25 Repealed].
22. Multistate Tax Compact, 59-22-1 to 59-22-9.
23. Charitable Trusts, 59-23-1 to 59-23-13.
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EXHIBIT "B"
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY
Collateral References.
Taxation<3=>98.
84 C.J.8. Taxation §§ 339 to 348.

59-5-1

Place for taxation of danr
rights, or water power, 64 A. L. R. 143,

CHAPTER 5
ASSESSMENT OP PROPERTY
ARTICLE 1.
2.
3.
4.

GENERAL PROVISIONS, 59-5-1 to 59-5-3.5.
ASSESSMENT BY COUNTY ASSESSOR, 59-5-4 to 59-5-18.
ASSESSMENT OF TRANSIENT LIVESTOCK AND HONEYBEES, 59-5-10 to 59-5-29.
DUTIES or COUNTY ASSESSOR, 59-5-30 to 59-5-36.

5.

STATE TAX COMMISSION, 59-5-37 to 59-5-51.

6.

ASSESSMENT BY STATE TAX COMMISSION, 59-5-52 to 59-5-65.

7.
8.

MINING OCCUPATION TAX, 59-5-66 to 59-5-85.
FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT OF 1969, 59-5-86 to 59-5-105.

9.

ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT, 59-5-106 to 59-5-111.

ARTICLE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property.
59-5-2. Assessment by county assessor—Basis of property taxation for county
and subdivisions!.
59-5-3. Assessment by state tax commission—Properties assessed by, enumerated.
59-5-3.5. Prorata application of ad valorem tax on property taken by eminent
domain or by right of entry agreement.

59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property.—All taxable property, not specifically exempt under Article XIII, section 2, of the Constitution of Utah,
must be assessed at thirty per cent of its reasonable fair cash value. Land
and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed.
the assessed owner has in the land, in complete disregard of its fair cash value which
would be in violation of this section.
Haves v. Gibbs. 110 U. 54, 169 P . 2d 781,
163* A. L. R. 513.

History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2506;
C. L. 1917, §5866; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
80-5-1; L. 1947, ch. 102, § 1 ; 1961, ch. 142,
§1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1947 amendment substituted "forty
per cent of its reasonable fair cash value"
for "at its full cash value."
The 1961 amendment inserted "not specifically exempt under Article X I I I , section 2, of the Constitution of Utah" and
substituted "thirty per cent" for "forty
per cent."

Burden of proof.
Burden to show inequality of assessment
was on taxpayer. First Nat. Bank v. Christensen, 39 U. 56S, 118 P . 778.
Coal lands.
A blanket assessment of all coal lands
in county could not be made a t a flat or
uniform rate. Ririe v. Randolph, 51 U.
274, 169 P . 941.

Administration of act.
The state t a x commission administers
this act. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State
Tax Comm., 327 U. S. 573, 90 L. Ed. 862,
«'i> S. Ct. 745, affirming 150 F . 2d 905.

Deductions.
Value of stock of corporation doing
business in state cannot be diminished, for
purposes of taxation, by deducting from
it value of property not situated or taxable
in state. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Chambers, 21 U. 324, 61 P . 560, affd. 182 U. S.
556, 45 L. Ed. 1227, 21 S. Ct. 863.

Building restrictions and easements.
To assess property without regard to a
'"lilding restriction or an easement would
'•o to assess it without regard to the nature
'ii<l extent of the property interest which
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BEFORE THE STATE BOARD OF TAX
REVIEW
LUCAS STATE OFFICE B U I L D I N G
DES MOINES, IOWA

MASSEY-FERGUSON

CREDIT

CORPORATION,
Appellant,

No. 48

vs.
D. G. B R I G G S , D I R E C T O R O F
REVENUE,

Decision

Respondent.

This matter came on for hearing before the State
Board of Tax Review on December 13, 1973. Present
at the hearing on behalf of the Appellant was Wilham
D. Griffin, State and Local Tax Manager, MasseyFerguson, Inc. Present on behalf of the Department
of Revenue were Harry M. Griger, Assistant Attorney
General, and Vernon Raile, Supervisor, Corporation
Audit Section. The State Board of Tax Review consisting of Louis I. Nussbaum, Chairman, Edwin A.
Hicklin and Keith A. McKinley, Members, upon coniii
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sideration of the notice of appeal from the order of the
Director, the answer filed, having heard all evidence
and arguments, does hereby make the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the State Board of Tax Review has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter herein.
2. That the Appellant appealed from the order of
the Director of Revenue dated June 15, 1973, which
order denies Appellant's claim for refund of corporation income tax in the amount of $7,510.00 for the
fiscal year ending October 31, 1969.
3. That the facts are summarized in the Director's
order of June 15, 1973, and were not in dispute at
the hearing before this Board.

CONCLUSIONS OF L A W
Under the provisions of Section 422.35(4), Code
of Iowa, a corporation may deduct 50 per cent of the
federal income taxes "paid or accrued" by the corporation during the taxable year.
In this case the Appellant accrued total federal
income taxes in the amount of $1,833,021.00 arising out
of profits from its operation during the fiscal year in
iv
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question. Had the Appellant filed a separate federal
corporate tax return, this would have been its tax liability. It did not, however, file a separate return but
rather filed a consolidated return with other subsidiaries
of Massey-Ferguson, Inc. Due to offsetting losses by
other subsidiaries the over-all effect was that the consolidated federal corporate return produced no income
tax. And as a matter of fact there was a refund of
estimated tax paid.
As between the Appellant and Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., there was an intercompany transaction in which
the Appellant paid to the parent company the amount
of its tax liability and the same was credited to surplus
by the parent company.
This Board adopts the position that in filing a
separate state corporate tax return the Appellant is
entitled to claim 50 per cent of the federal income tax
which is "accrued" by that corporation in determining
its state tax liability under the provisions of Section
422.35(4).
In support of this position the Board favorably
considers the language of the Supreme Court of Kansas
in the case of Cities Service Gas Company v. McDonald, 466 P2nd 277. In this case the Court is considering a factual situation much like the one at hand and
a Kansas statute similar to our own statute.
Inasmuch as this matter can be disposed of through
V
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the interpretation of the above referenced section, the
Board need not consider nor pass on the question concerning the filing of a consolidated state corporate tax
return.
I T I S T H E R E F O R E O R D E R E D by the
State Board of Tax Review, Mr. Nussbaum and Mr.
McKinley concurring and Mr. Hicklin dissenting, that
the Director's order in upholding the Department of
Revenue's assessment against Appellant be reversed,
that the assessment against the Appellant be cancelled,
and that Director be ordered to refund to the Appellant the sum of $7,510.00, plus interest as may be required by Statute.
Done at Des Monies, Iowa, this 8th day of July,
1974.

IOWA STATE BOARD OF
TAX REVIEW
By / s / Louis L. Nussbaum
Louis L. Nussbaum, Chairman
By / s / Keith A. McKinley
Keith A. McKinley
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